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ABSTRACT 
We analyze the characteristics of the patents held by firms in the 
software industry. Unlike prior researchers, we rely on the examination of 
individual patents to determine which patents involve software inventions. 
This method of identifying the relevant patents is more laborious than the 
methods that previous scholars have used, but it produces a data set from 
which we can learn more about the role of patents in the software 
industry. In general, we find that patents the computer technology firms 
obtain on software inventions have more prior art references, claims, and 
forward citations than the patents that the same firms obtain on 
nonsoftware inventions. We also find that the patents that “pure” software 
firms (those producing only software) obtain on software inventions have 
more prior art references, claims, and forward citations than the software 
patents obtained by the firms that derive revenues from other product 
lines. Finally, we conclude that the patents of the largest firms are no 
better (or worse) than the patents of the smallest firms, belying the idea 
that large firms are plagued by challenges based on the worthless patents 
of their smaller competitors. 
The Article closes with a brief discussion of the implications of our 
empirical analysis. The findings undermine the strongest criticisms about 
the low quality of software patents. It is simply not accurate to say that 
software patents as a group have remarkably low numbers of prior art 
references and forward citations. Thus, these findings cut against 
technology-based patent reforms designed to make it more difficult to 
obtain software patents. On the other hand, the evidence that small firms 
are no less capable than large firms of producing quality patents 
undermines concerns that higher hurdles at the early stage of the 
patenting process would disadvantage smaller inventors. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/2
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the use of patents has become commonplace in the software 
industry, concerns about their propriety have remained surprisingly strong. 
It is easy to understand why those who were late to develop effective 
patenting strategies would oppose software patents in the mid-1990s, 
when patenting began to spread broadly through the industry.1 However, 
despite the widespread use of patenting in the modern software industry, 
the concerns about software patents have continued. For example, the 
Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) October 2003 report, To Promote 
Innovation, summarizes hearings in which “[m]any panelists and 
participants expressed the view that software and Internet patents are 
impeding innovation.”2 As technologist Hal Varian proclaims, there has 
been “a steady reduction in patent quality, with patents of dubious novelty 
being granted routinely.”3 Similarly, the National Research Council 
decries events that are “degrading the quality of” new patents, especially 
in high technology industries.4 Large firms in particular have complained 
about the poor quality of the patents being asserted against them in 
litigation.5 Most recently, a 2006 Brookings Institution Report authored by 
Doug Lichtman identifies problems in ensuring patent quality as one of the 
principal justifications for a proposal to abandon the legal presumption of 
patent validity.6 
 
 
 1. See John R. Allison, Abe Dunn & Ronald J. Mann, Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1579 (2007). 
 2. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3 at 56 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 3. Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene; A Patent That Protects a Better Mousetrap Spurs 
Innovation, But What About One for a New Way to Amuse a Cat?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at C2, 
available at 2004 WLNR 5608092. 
 4. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 1, 46–51 (2004). A scholarly volume that accompanies this report emphasizes concerns that 
“a weakening of the standards of novelty and non-obviousness [has] undermin[ed] the purpose of 
patents to provide an incentive to those who innovate in a genuine way.” PATENTS IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 2 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). 
 5. See, e.g., Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 18 (2005) (statement of 
Richard J. Lutton, Jr., Chief Patent Counsel, Apple) (“The current patent system has given rise to too 
many low quality patents being issued, and a growing pattern of assertions of weak patents that 
threaten to damage productive companies and stifle innovation.”). But see INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
OWNERS ASSOC., IPO SURVEY: CORPORATE PATENT QUALITY PERCEPTIONS IN THE U.S. (2005) 
(reporting a survey in which most respondents believe patent quality is unsatisfactory or poor, more 
believe that patent quality will continue to deteriorate than expect it to improve, and the overwhelming 
majority believe that litigation costs will increase in the next three years). 
 6. Doug Lichtman, Aligning Patent Presumptions with the Reality of Patent Review: A Proposal 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Although a good deal of the public criticism can be dismissed as self-
serving efforts to promote the interests of particular sectors of the 
industry,7 two distinct variants of the criticism are substantial. The first is 
the idea that software patents impede innovation because they hinder entry 
by new firms.8 The second is closely related to the first but reflects a 
distinct concern about the craft and effort reflected in the patents 
themselves, rather than the competitive structure of the industry in which 
they are deployed.9 Indeed, the seriousness of this concern is underscored 
by the central role of the software industry in the Community Patent 
Review Initiative10 and in such initiatives as IBM’s effort to develop a 
“Patent Quality Index.”11 
There has been a great deal of writing on the first subject, including 
some sophisticated econometric analysis on the relation between patenting 
and innovation and competition in the software industry.12 There has been 
 
 
for Patent Reform 5 (The Brookings Inst., Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2006–10, 2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Matthew Broersma, Stallman: OSDL Patent Project “Worse Than Nothing,” Sept. 
19, 2006, http://news.com/2102-7344_3-6117131.html (discussing the view of Free Software 
Foundation founder Richard Stallman that all software patents are inappropriate). For a thorough 
discussion of the relation between patent strategy and policy perspectives of software firms, see 
Allison, Dunn & Mann, supra note 1. 
 8. See, e.g., PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 2. 
 9. See, e.g., David Evans and Anne Layne-Farrar, Software Patents and Open Source: The 
Battle over Intellectual Property Rights, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. No. 10 ¶ 25 (2004) (summarizing 
complaints about “trivial” software patents); Mark H. Webbink, A New Paradigm for Intellectual 
Property Rights in Software, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶¶ 5–8 (2005) (complaining about trivial and 
invalid software patents); James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation 
20 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 00-01, 2000) (arguing that “software 
patents have been too broad and too obvious”); John Kasdan, Obviousness and New Technologies 
(Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Columbia Law & Economics Working Paper No. 146, 1999); see also 
John H. Barton, Reforming the Patent System, 287 SCIENCE 1933 (2000) (criticizing bad patents as a 
problem that pervades all of the high-technology sectors); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363 (2001) (criticizing the “potential monopoly costs of 
unjustified patents” because of a general decline in the doctrine of obviousness). 
 10. See Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review and Patent 
Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2006). 
 11. See Jennifer LaClaire, IBM Teams with OSDL, USPTO on Patent Quality Initiative, E-
COMMERCE TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/48212.html. IBM’s senior 
vice president of technology and intellectual property explained IBM’s motivation as follows: 
“[r]aising the quality of patents will encourage continued investment in research and development by 
individual inventors, small businesses, corporations and academic institutions while helping to prevent 
over-protection that works against innovation and the public interest.” Id. 
 12. For a selection of the most recent papers of interest, see MICHAEL NOEL & MARK 
SCHANKERMAN, STRATEGIC PATENTING AND SOFTWARE INNOVATION (2006) (analyzing whether 
patenting by software firms has positive or negative spillovers). Professor Mann has also individually 
written about this subject, providing a mix of qualitative interviews and empirical analysis of patenting 
practices. See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 961 (2005) [hereinafter Mann, Software Patents]; Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, 
Venture Capital, and Software Startups, 36 RES. POL’Y 193 (2007); Iain M. Cockburn & Megan J. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/2
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much less writing about the second subject. Given the concern that an 
unduly lax standard for issuing patents will have an adverse effect on 
economic growth,13 as well as the importance of the software sector to our 
economy, questions about the quality of such a rapidly growing type of 
patent are important. Thus, although Stuart Graham and David Mowery’s 
work includes a preliminary assessment of the frequency with which 
subsequent patentees cite the patents owned by large software firms,14 
there is much more to be done. 
The problem becomes even more urgent as policymakers in all three 
branches seriously consider reforms to the patent system that are justified 
for the most part by anecdotal complaints about the system rather than 
actual analysis of software patents as a group. For example, the 109th 
Congress considered a series of bills proposing major changes to patent 
procedures designed to respond to a perceived problem with quality.15 The 
PTO has its own Strategic Plan 2007–2012, which advocates a major 
reallocation of priorities and resources to satisfy the primary goal of 
 
 
MacGarvie, Entry, Exit and Patenting in the Software Industry (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12563, 2006) (analyzing the effects of patenting rates on entry and exit into sectors 
of the software industry); Bronwyn H. Hall & Megan MacGarvie, The Private Value of Software 
Patents (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12195, 2006) (analyzing the effect of 
software patents on the value of the firms that hold them). 
 13. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive 
System? (University of California at Berkeley, Economics Working Papers E01-303, 2001); Bronwyn 
H. Hall & Megan MacGarvie, Business Method Patents, Innovation, and Policy (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9717, 2006). 
 14. Stuart J.H. Graham & David C. Mowery, Software Patents: Good News or Bad News? (Geor. 
Inst. of Tech., T1:GER Working Paper, 2004) [hereinafter Graham & Mowery, Software Patents]. For 
careful case studies analyzing the quality of particular software patents, see Martin Campbell-Kelly, 
Not All Bad: An Historical Perspective on Software Patents, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
191, 214–15 (2005); Martin Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, A Technical Critique of Fifty 
Software Patents, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 241 (2005). 
 15. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. §§ 9–10 (as proposed by H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 15, 2005) (altering postgrant procedures and easing rules for pregrant 
third-party submissions, both to respond to perceived quality problems); see also Patent Reform Act of 
2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. §§ 6–7. The concerns about quality are most evident at the hearings on 
those bills. See, e.g., Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795, The Patent Act of 2005: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) (statement of Emery Simon, Counsel, Business Software 
Alliance) (contending that “the IT industry, like so many others, is encountering the enormous costs of 
dealing with patents of questionably quality” and offering as evidence the fact that “hundreds of patent 
infringement suits are pending against computer software and hardware companies, costing the 
industry hundreds of millions of dollars each year”); Patent Act of 2005: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 50 (2005) (statements of Mr. Griswold, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, 3M 
Innovative Properties Co.) (“[O]ur solution[] is to start with the major problem. The problem is patents 
of low quality.”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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“optimiz[ing] patent quality and timeliness.”16 Finally, and most visibly, 
the United States Supreme Court in the last few years has granted 
certiorari in an unusually large number of patent cases, motivated in part 
by concerns that excessive numbers of low-quality patents may be stifling 
innovation.17 
This paper responds to that gap in the literature by providing detailed 
empirical analysis of the patents held by software firms. Specifically, we 
examine the roughly 34,000 patents held by the firms listed in a leading 
industry periodical during the five-year period from 1998–2002. We 
started by collecting a list of the firms from Software Magazine’s 
“Software 500.” Relying on questionnaires disseminated by the magazine, 
that list indicates the top five hundred firms in the software industry each 
year by revenue from software and services. Based on industry interviews, 
we believe that the response rate is quite high. The list appears to be 
widely regarded as authoritative within the industry. Martin Campbell-
Kelly, for example, uses the list pervasively in his comprehensive history 
of the industry.18 It is, by way of comparison, considerably more 
comprehensive than the “Softletter 100” list (which is limited to 
prepackaged software providers) that Graham and Mowery use.19 Because 
 
 
 16. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, STRATEGIC PLAN 2007–2012, available at 
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007. A central concern of the plan is to improve the quality of 
patent applications because of the PTO’s view that “[b]etter application input contributes directly to 
more efficient processing and to quality, thereby benefiting both the examiner and the applicant.” 
Patent Quality Enhancement in the Information-Based Economy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(statement of the Honorable Jon W. Dudas, Director of United States Patent and Trademark Office). 
For empirical evidence assessing the extent of that problem, see John L. King, Patent Examination 
Procedures and Patent Quality, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 
54.  
 17. This concern is most evident in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842–43 (2006) (concurring in decision that injunctions in 
patent infringement cases should not be automatic and rather based on traditional principles of equity, 
but expressing a belief that too many ill-advised patents had been granted on software-implemented 
business methods). It also appears to underlie the grants in cases such as Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. 
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 999 (2005), writ dismissed as improvidently granted, 126 S. Ct. 2921 
(2006) (granting certiorari to review whether method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate 
by observing correlation with elevated level of total homocysteine is patentable subject matter), and in 
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (granting certiorari to review the standard for 
combining prior art references to determine whether a patent is invalid for obviousness); see also 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (granting certiorari to review whether software 
can be a “component” of a patented invention supplied from the United States to a foreign country 
and, if so, whether copying the software in the foreign country amounts to “combining” it with other 
components to make an infringing invention in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)). 
 18. MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY, FROM AIRLINE RESERVATIONS TO SONIC THE HEDGEHOG: A 
HISTORY OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY (2003). 
 19. Stewart J.H. Graham & David C. Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection in the U.S. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/2
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of considerable turnover in the industry, the “Software 500” list includes 
about 1,100 firms for the five years.20 Of importance for our project, it 
extends from the largest firms in the industry (IBM and Microsoft were 
first and second throughout the five-year study period) to much smaller 
firms (iCIMS, Inc. was the smallest firm in 2002, with annual revenues of 
only $400,000). We then collected from Delphion a complete set of all of 
the 34,000 patents issued between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 
2002, to each of the listed firms. 
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. Part II addresses the threshold 
question of what exactly should count as a software patent. Unlike prior 
researchers, we examine the individual patents to determine which patents 
involve software inventions. This method of identifying the relevant 
patents is more labor intensive than the methods on which previous 
scholars have relied, but it produces a data set with a far lower error rate. 
Part III considers what it means to discuss patent “quality” and “value.” 
We build on a substantial body of literature that connects the value and 
quality of patents to objective features of the patents: the number of claims 
in the patents, the number of prior art references in the patents, and the 
number of forward citations (citations to a patent received in later 
patents).21 We compare software patents to the nonsoftware patents 
obtained by the same firms, not only because our data set contains large 
numbers of both types of patents, but also because we believe that such a 
comparison may provide more direct insight into questions of relative 
quality and value than a comparison of software patents to a sample from 
the general population of patents. In general, we find that the patents firms 
obtain on their software inventions have more claims, cite more 
references, and are more frequently cited as prior art by later patents 
(“forward citations”) than the patents the same firms obtain on their 
 
 
Software Industry, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 219, 232. 
[hereinafter Graham & Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection]. 
 20. Because the purpose of our study is to focus on firms that can be fairly characterized as 
software firms, we excluded the eighteen firms that did not derive at least 20% of their total revenues 
from software in any of the five years for which we collected data. The excluded firms are Cisco, 
Hitachi, Intel, NEC, Raytheon, Valassis, PreVision Marketing, VCON, Adaptec, Alstom ESCA, 
Amdahl, Brooktrout, Infolmage, International Network Services, Kasten Chase, MessageQuest, 
Template Software, and TYX. 
 21. There may be other indicators of effort on the part of the applicant, but these characteristics 
have been most prominent in the existing literature, in large part because they are readily accessible in 
an automated way from existing databases of patent information. Other indicators that might be 
probative (such as the number of references added by the examiner or adequate correspondence 
between the specification and claims) are not as easily assessed in a replicable and automated way. On 
January 1, 2001, the USPTO began identifying examiner-added prior art references on the face of the 
patent, but 60% of the patents in our data set were issued prior to that time. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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nonsoftware inventions. We explain below the relationship of patent 
characteristics such as number of claims, prior art references, and forward 
citations to the concepts of patent quality and value. We also consider the 
possibility noted in the existing literature that the patents obtained by pure 
software firms would differ in quality and value from patents obtained by 
less specialized firms. We ultimately conclude that our data set supports 
that hypothesis. 
Finally, Part IV closes with a brief discussion of the implications of our 
empirical analysis. First, we believe that the findings undermine the 
strongest criticisms about the low quality of software patents. Whatever 
one might glean from subjective analyses of the nature of the inventions 
disclosed by each patent, it is simply wrong to assert, for example, that 
software patents, as a group, fail in any notable way to mention the 
relevant prior art. Second, contrary to the idea that large firms are plagued 
by a mass of low-quality patents obtained by smaller firms, these findings 
suggest that there is no substantial difference between the patents obtained 
by the largest and most experienced patentees and those obtained by their 
less well-capitalized competitors. Collectively, we argue, these findings 
have important ramifications for patent reform, because they cut decisively 
against reforms focused on a particular area of technology. At the same 
time, to the extent they suggest that lack of resources is not a constraint on 
patent quality, they undermine the concern that reforms raising the bar for 
patent filings will operate to the particular detriment of smaller inventors. 
II. WHAT IS A SOFTWARE PATENT? 
This Article employs a definition of a software patent developed by 
one of the authors after several years of studying tens of thousands of 
computer-industry patents—a definition we believe to be the only one 
formulated thus far that can be used to identify software patents with 
principled consistency. We explain that definition after discussing several 
previous attempts to identify data sets of software patents for research 
purposes. 
For various reasons, identifying a data set of software patents is a 
difficult task—what Professors Graham and Mowery have called the 
“thorniest” task for a scholar in this area.22 First, there is no universally 
accepted definition of what a software patent is. Second, neither the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) classification system nor the 
 
 
 22. Graham & Mowery, Software Patents, supra note 14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/2
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International Patent Classification (IPC) system was designed for that 
purpose; both systems focus on functionality at a low level of abstraction 
and are unsuitable for defining any technology area at a conceptual level. 
Third, even if these systems were suitable for identifying a technology 
area, software is a critical element of inventions in so many disparate 
fields that it presents an unusual challenge for any categorical 
classification system.23 
The existing literature includes three separate efforts to identify a large 
data set of software patents. The first was by Graham and Mowery.24 They 
did not attempt to define the term “software patent,” but rather first used 
the IPC classification system and, subsequently, the USPTO classification 
system in an effort to develop a class-based data set of software patents 
owned by prepackaged software firms.25 Specifically, they first identified 
prepackaged software firms, using the “Softletter 100,” an industry 
publication that identifies the one hundred largest prepackaged software 
firms.26 Then, Graham and Mowery identified the classifications of the 
patents assigned to those firms. Using those classifications, they ran 
additional searches to compile a data set of software patents.27 Generally, 
Graham and Mowery analyze those data sets to assess the relation between 
patenting and research and development (R&D) and find no strong 
evidence that strategic patenting is impeding innovation.28 As a 
definitional matter, their methodology produces large concentrations of 
patents on software inventions. At the same time, as we discuss below, it 
 
 
 23. With respect to the USPTO classification system, part of the problem reflects the changes 
over time of the relevant U.S. patent classifications that are most commonly used for software-related 
inventions. For a careful discussion of that development, see GREGORY A. STOBBS, SOFTWARE 
PATENTS ¶ 5.10[D], at 43–50 (Supp. 2006) (discussing the replacement of the old 395 class by a new 
set of classes in the 700 series). 
 24. Graham & Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection, supra note 19. 
 25. See id. (definition based on IPCs); Graham & Mowery, Software Patents, supra note 14 
(definition based on U.S. patent classes). 
 26. Graham & Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection, supra note 19, at 232. As the 
discussion below should make clear, our project uses a considerably broader conception of the 
software industry, which is based on Software Magazine’s “Software 500” and covers many sectors 
excluded from the prepackaged software sector classification with which Graham and Mowery work. 
See, e.g., The 2007 Software 500, http://www.softwaremag.com/SW500/index.cfm?trk=n&id= 
&MODE= (listing rankings for 2006 and showing the large number of software industry sectors 
represented). 
 27. The IPC-based definition uses G06F 3/ 5/ 7/ 9/ 11/ 12/ 13/ & 15/; G06K 9/ & 15/; and H04L 
9/ to develop a data set of patents held by the top fifteen firms in the 1995 “Softletter 100.” Graham & 
Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection, supra note 19, at 231–32. The definition based on U.S. 
classes uses classes 345, 358, 382, 704, 707, 709–11, 713–15, and 717 to develop a data set of all 
patents issued in those classes from 1987–2003. Graham & Mowery, Software Patents, supra note 14, 
at 14. 
 28. Graham & Mowery, Software Patents, supra note 14, at 19–22. 
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omits several classes that contain large numbers of software patents—
namely, those obtained by software firms that are not prepackaged 
software firms. 
The second significant effort to identify a large set of software patents 
appears in a paper by Jim Bessen and Robert Hunt.29 Eschewing a class-
based definition, Bessen and Hunt instead develop a keyword-search 
algorithm. Their technique starts with a definition of the term “software 
patent” that includes, as we do,30 patents on inventions in which the data 
processing algorithms are carried out by code either stored on a magnetic 
storage medium or embedded in chips (“firmware”).31 In applying this 
 
 
 29. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 7–9 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 03-17/R, 2004). 
 30. As Bessen and Hunt note, one of the current authors, John Allison, earlier employed a 
definition of software patent that excluded “firmware,” including only inventions in which the code 
implementing the data processing algorithms are stored on a magnetic storage medium. Id. at 9; see 
also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the U.S. Patent System, 82 B.U. 
L. REV. 77, 89 (2002); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical 
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2110–11 (2000); John R. Allison & 
Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1029 (2003). The 
reasons for using this definition were a combination of initial doubt and compromise with a coauthor, 
followed by a need for consistency. Each of those articles made use of the same data set of 1,000 
randomly selected patents-in-general issued between mid-1996 and mid-1998. After gaining a great 
deal more experience from closely reading thousands of computer-related patents, Allison became 
firmly convinced that the definition should include firmware. When he used the same set of 1,000 
randomly selected patents in a subsequent article, he studied each patent again and reclassified them 
using a definition that included firmware. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore, 
& R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004) (definition not explicitly provided in 
article) [hereinafter Allison et al.]. Allison used this more inclusive definition not only in that paper 
and in this one, but also in an extensive empirical study of more than 7,600 university-owned patents. 
See Arti K. Rai, John R. Allison, Bhaven Sampat & Colin Crossman, University Software Ownership: 
Technology Transfer or Business as Usual? (Duke Law Sch., Research Paper No. 20, 2007), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=996456. Thus, when we say that identifying a 
large set of software patents is daunting, we speak from rich experience. 
 31. We note another, possibly minor, difference between the basic definition that Bessen and 
Hunt start with and the definition we use in this study. However, the effects of those differences are 
difficult to gauge. The Bessen-Hunt definition of a software patent includes patents on inventions that 
“use” software as part of the invention, but excludes those that “use” off-the-shelf software: 
Our concept of software patent involves a logic algorithm for processing data that is 
implemented via stored instructions; that is, the logic is not “hard-wired.” These instructions 
could reside on a disk or other storage medium or they could be stored in “firmware,” that is, 
a read-only memory, as is typical of embedded software. But we want to exclude inventions 
that involve only off-the-shelf software—that is, the software must be at least novel in the 
sense of needing to be custom-coded, if not actually meeting the patent office standard for 
novelty. 
Bessen & Hunt, supra note 29, at 8. 
 Our definition does not distinguish between custom-coded and off-the-shelf software or firmware 
because, even if it makes sense to do so (and we cannot be sure that it does), it is a distinction that is 
frequently impracticable to apply.  The written descriptions occasionally provide a basis for making 
this distinction, but many times do not.  
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definition, however, Bessen and Hunt rely on automated word searches of 
the specifications (written descriptions) of patents in their sample. 
Specifically, Bessen and Hunt start by examining a random sample of 
patents, which they classify according to their definition and use as the 
basis for a keyword-search algorithm that they can then apply en masse to 
classify patents more broadly.32 Like Graham and Mowery, Bessen and 
Hunt focus their statistical analysis on the relation between patenting and 
R&D. Their conclusion, however, is much more pessimistic: that the 
increase in patent propensity during the 1990s reflects a patent “arms race” 
that undermines incentives to innovate.33 As a definitional matter, they 
report in their paper that a test of their algorithm on a random sample 
indicates a false positive rate of 16% and a false negative rate of 22%.34 
Given those error rates, previous scholars have criticized their method for 
including excessive numbers of patents that are not fairly regarded as 
software patents.35 As we discuss below, their definition also omits broad 
classes of patents that plainly cover software inventions.36 
 
 
 32. Bessen and Hunt’s keyword search query consisted of: ((“software” in specification) or 
(“computer” AND “program” in specification)) AND (utility patent excluding reissues) ANDNOT 
(“chip” OR “semiconductor” OR “bus” OR “circuit” OR “circuitry” in title) ANDNOT (“antigen” OR 
“antigenic” OR “chromatography” in specification). Id. at 42. 
 33. Id. at 26–38. 
 34. Id. at 9. 
 35. See Robert W. Hahn & Scott Wallsten, A Review of Bessen and Hunt’s Analysis of Software 
Patents (Nov. 2003) (unpublished note, on file with the AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr.); Graham & 
Mowery, Software Patents, supra note 14; Anne Layne-Farrar, Defining Software Patents: A Research 
Field Guide (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 05-14, 2005).  
 36. For a discussion and comparison of efforts to define software patents, see Layne-Farrar, 
supra note 35. Layne-Farrar compared the results of the Bessen-Hunt study, the Graham-Mowery 
studies, and a study by John Allison and Emerson Tiller to determine how accurately the studies 
identified software patents. Id. at 4; John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, Internet Business Method 
Patents, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 259, 259–84. Layne-
Farrar reports that software “experts” (associates in her firm with computer science degrees) read a 
random sample of patents from the data sets in each study to determine which patents in those studies 
that were asserted as being software were not actually software (“false positives”). She found that the 
Bessen-Hunt data set included a very large percentage of false positives, but that the Graham-Mowery 
data sets and the Allison-Tiller data set contained only about 5% false positives. Layne-Farrar, supra 
note 35, at 16, 24 tbl.2. Some caveats about the Layne-Farrar study are in order. First, the random 
samples used by Layne-Farrar were taken from attempted replications of the data sets, not the actual 
sets. Id. Second, there was no indication that the readers with computer science degrees actually had 
extensive experience in studying software patents. Third, there was no indication that these readers 
used any particular definition of a software patent. Fourth, the replicated data set from the Allison-
Tiller study was a preliminary one of approximately 2,800 patents before Allison and Tiller further 
refined it to a set of 1,423 internet-related software and software-implemented business method 
patents. Id. Fifth, the Allison-Tiller data set was not an appropriate one for use in her comparison. 
Even if she had used the final, refined Allison-Tiller data set, that data set did not purport to be a 
complete or even representative set of software patents; rather, it included all patents in PTO data-
processing classes 705, 707, and 709 issued through the end of 1999 that clearly addressed internet 
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The third notable effort, in a recent working paper by Bronwyn Hall 
and Megan MacGarvie,37 combines those approaches. Hall and MacGarvie 
first develop their own set of patent classes, by looking to classes 
commonly used in patents assigned to fifteen large software firms.38 Then, 
they combine the patents in those classes with the patents in the IPC-class 
definition developed in the first Graham-Mowery paper.39 Finally, they 
apply the Bessen-Hunt textual search to the patents in the combined set of 
classes and exclude the patents that do not satisfy the search criteria.40 The 
object of their analysis is to consider whether the arguable reduction of 
patentability restrictions in the 1990s increased or decreased the value of 
firms in the industry.41 They generally conclude that the initial extension 
of patentability decreased the value of firms in the industry but that market 
values have increased substantially in the subsequent years.42 
Although each of the three previous definitions has the benefit of 
objectivity and replicability, and consequently can be applied to large data 
sets in an automated fashion, they sacrifice a great deal of accuracy. The 
classification system does not closely match the variety of patents 
obtained on software, and keyword searches produce at best a crude match 
to software patenting. On that point, Allison’s studies of tens of thousands 
of computer-related patents convince us that different patent owners make 
highly idiosyncratic uses of language in the titles, abstracts, written 
descriptions, and claims of patents even in closely related technology 
fields. Moreover, as software is a critical part of inventions in far-flung 
fields, reliance on particular search terms will produce a data set that is 
substantially overinclusive and underinclusive at the same time.43  
 
 
applications. Allison & Tiller, supra, at 261 n.10. Although internet-related patents are a subset of 
software patents, the objective of the Allison-Tiller study was to identify that subset of patents, not 
software patents in general. 
 37. Hall & MacGarvie, supra note 12. 
 38. Id. at 14–15. 
 39. Id. at 15–16. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 5–6. 
 42. Id. at 31–32. 
 43. To illustrate the problem, consider a few examples of overinclusiveness. Among the patents 
that satisfy the Bessen-Hunt algorithm are the following: 
• Genetic Control of Flowering, U.S. Patent No. 6,265,637 (filed Jan. 11, 1999). The 
patent claims cover genetic engineering methods and products. Id. Although the 
claimed invention did not involve data processing, the Bessen-Hunt algorithm 
identified the patent as software because the inventors employed an existing software 
program in their research to predict the probability of a genomic sequence, and the 
word “software” thus appeared twice in the patent specification. 
• Frozen Food Product, U.S. Patent No. 6,096,867 (filed July 22, 1997). The patent 
covers a frozen dessert product with a specified composition. Id. The Bessen-Hunt 
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Because of the problems with the earlier definitions, our work rests on 
a different approach—a careful patent-by-patent examination of the nature 
of the invention. As we discuss below, we have attempted to make our 
classification process as objective as possible. We start with the following 
definition of a software patent: “a software patent is one in which at least 
one claim element covers data processing—that is, the act of manipulating 
data—regardless of whether the code carrying out that data processing is 
on a magnetic storage medium or embedded in a chip.” 
Based on Allison’s experimentation with various definitions in the 
course of individually studying tens of thousands of patents in several 
different studies over the years, we believe that this definition is both 
appropriately inclusive and susceptible to principled, consistent 
application. It also is important that our definition captures the realities of 
claim drafting. It is common for most of the elements of a patent claim to 
describe the prior art, with one or two elements describing the purportedly 
novel and nonobvious advance. For example, claims in the patents of 
computer hardware manufacturers often purport to cover items such as a 
generic router, server, printer, scanner, or other hardware, with perhaps 
only one claim element consisting of a function carried out by 
algorithms.44 The same is true of patents issued to manufacturers outside 
 
 
algorithm identified the patent as software because the inventors used the word 
“software” in the specification when they described how they employed an existing 
software program in their research for imaging and measuring the size of ice crystals. 
• Hammer Device, U.S. Patent No. 5,305,841 (filed Oct. 9, 1992). This invention 
consists of a rock-crushing device. Id. The algorithm identified the patent as software 
because the inventors used the phrase “computer program” in the specification when 
they described their use of an existing software program for simulation purposes while 
designing the mechanical device. 
• Thermoplastic Polypropylene Blends with Mixtures of Ethylene/Butene & 
Ethylene/Octene Copolymer Elastomers, U.S. Patent No. 5,985,971 (filed Oct. 29, 
1997). This invention consists of certain groups of chemical compositions claimed to 
have superior adherence for coating materials such as automotive paints. Id. The 
algorithm identified the patent as software because the specification used the term 
“software” in connection with the inventor’s use of a commercially available software 
program for simulating molding conditions in which the claimed compositions would 
be useful. 
• Storage Case for Compact Discs, U.S. Patent No. 5,954,197 (filed Dec. 16, 1996). This 
invention consists of a mechanical storage and shipping container for CDs. Id. The 
algorithm identified the patent as software because the word “computers” appeared in 
the specification when the inventors noted than were CDs in jewel cases were easier to 
load into the CD drives of personal computers than CDs were stored in older types of 
cases. Separately, the specification used the word “program” to refer to audio program 
material commonly found on CDs. Thus, both “computer” and “program” were in the 
patent’s written description. 
 44. See, e.g., Method and Apparatus for Distinguishing Transparent Media, U.S. Patent No. 
6,497,179 (filed July 19, 2001). Claim 1 of that patent reads: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 297 Allison Mann book pages.doc 1/23/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
310 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:297 
 
 
 
 
the computer industry, such as a patent on a magnetic resonance imaging 
machine, in which perhaps only one claim element covers algorithms 
enabling the machine to accomplish a given imaging task.45 A claim 
covers the entire invention; and in a case like this, the entire invention is 
not just the algorithms in isolation but instead is a piece of hardware that 
allegedly does something different because of the new algorithms. 
Moreover, patent attorneys do substantial harm to their client-applicants if 
they include an element in a claim that is not essential, because doing so 
narrows the scope of the patent. Thus, including a claim element covering 
the manipulation of data reveals that, at a minimum, data processing is a 
critical part of the invention. 
Applying that methodology, we examined each of the 20,000 patents 
issued to firms other than IBM to determine whether it was a patent on a 
software invention. For the 14,000 IBM patents, we read a random sample 
of over 300 patents and extrapolated from that sample. Using that 
methodology, about 68% (13,500) of the non-IBM patents and about 55% 
of the IBM patents (extrapolating from the sample that we examined) 
 
 
1. A printer (10) having a transparency film discrimination system, the discrimination system 
comprising: feed mechanism (18) for feeding a print medium (12) toward a print mechanism 
(20), the print medium (12) being one of a plurality of different types, each type having a 
print surface (14); illumination source (42) for providing light to impinge on the print surface 
(14); detector (48) for detecting one of reflected and transmitted light from the print surface 
(14) to provide a detection signal representing the print surface (14) so as to allow 
identification of transparency type of the print medium (12); and processor (28) for applying 
metric criteria to the detected signal to identify type of transparency of the print medium (12) 
and for providing control to the print mechanism (20) dependent on the identified 
transparency type so that damage to the printer (10) is avoided. 
 45. See, e.g., Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Diagnostic Apparatus, U.S. Patent No. 4,656,423 
(filed Nov. 4, 1983). Claim 1 reads: 
1. An apparatus for examining an object by nuclear magnetic resonance comprising: magnet 
means for applying to the object a static magnetic field along an axis thereof; gradient coil 
means arranged along said axis, for applying to said object a first symmetric gradient 
magnetic field that in conjunction with said static magnetic field gives a predetermined 
constant magnetic field in a substantially two-dimensional plane of said object perpendicular 
to said axis, and for applying to said plane at least a second symmetric gradient magnetic field 
perpendicular to said first gradient magnetic field for defining a line within said plane along 
which nuclear magnetic resonance signals are read out; probe head coil means for applying 
RF pulses to said plane to excite nuclei therein, and for detecting nuclear magnetic resonance 
signals derived from said line; shifting coil means, arranged along said axis and disposed 
adjacent to and independent from said gradient coil means for superimposing an additional 
asymmetric gradient magnetic field parallel to and on said first gradient magnetic field 
independently of generation of said first magnetic gradient to shift said plane of 
predetermined constant magnetic field intensity in a direction perpendicular to said plane; and 
reconstruction means for receiving said nuclear magnetic resonance signals and for 
reconstructing a computerized tomographic image for a plane selected by the cooperation of 
said additional magnetic field with said first gradient magnetic field. 
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qualified as “software patents,” for a blended total of about 62% (21,200) 
software patents. Table 1 summarizes the major classes of software patents 
using both the IPC and USPTO classification systems. 
TABLE 1: LEADING SOFTWARE PATENT CLASSES 
IPC 
CLASS 
S/W 
PATENTS 
IN CLASS 
% OF ALL 
S/W 
PATENTS 
CUM. % OF 
S/W 
PATENTS 
USPTO 
CLASS
S/W 
PATENTS 
IN CLASS
% OF 
ALL S/W 
PATENTS
CUM. % 
OF S/W 
PATENTS
G06F 8875 63.2 63.2 707 1551 11.0 11.0 
H04L 583 4.2 67.4 345 1434 10.2 21.2 
G06K 502 3.6 71.0 709 1264 9.0 30.2 
G06T 438 3.1 74.1 711 890 6.3 36.5 
H04N 329 2.3 76.4 710 753 5.4 41.9 
H04B 317 2.3 78.7 714 730 5.2 47.1 
G09G 262 1.9 80.6 717 664 4.7 51.8 
G10L 241 1.7 82.3 713 637 4.5 56.3 
B41J 227 1.6 83.9 370 598 4.3 60.6 
H04J 206 1.5 85.4 382 420 3.0 63.6 
 
The most obvious problem with our methodology is that it requires 
reading every patent, an extraordinarily slow and laborious process. 
Although the appropriate treatment of many patents is obvious under this 
definition, a substantial percentage must be studied with care.46 Claims are 
often obtuse, and, in the computer field, they are frequently broad in 
scope. As a result, in many cases one must not only read the independent 
claims closely, but also examine the dependent claims and study the 
written description for assistance in interpreting the claim language.47 
In the end, we acknowledge an irreducible element of subjectivity that 
undermines the ease with which our determinations can be replicated. At 
the same time, however, it seems clear that our determinations will be 
more accurate than the comparatively crude ones made under the 
automated class-based or keyword-search methodologies discussed above. 
For example, although the Graham-Mowery class-based searches are not 
significantly overinclusive because they limit their data set to patents 
owned by prepackaged software firms, the searches are significantly 
underinclusive. They exclude seven of the ten largest classes of software 
patents, including several classes that are dominated by software patents in 
 
 
 46. Because patents from firms in computer-related industries are more likely to include patents 
that are close to the line between software and nonsoftware patents, the percentage requiring careful 
scrutiny is far higher for a project like this one than it is for a project (like Allison’s previous projects) 
studying a population of patents across a broad array of fields. 
 47. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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our data collection, such as IPC G06T (image data processing or 
generation)48 and H04J (multiplex communication).49 A similar problem 
afflicts their more recent definition based on USPTO classifications, 
where they exclude several classes that in our data set are dominated by 
software patents, such as classes 455 (telecommunications),50 712 
(processing architectures and instruction processing for electrical 
computers),51 and 719 (interprogram or interprocess communication for 
electrical computers).52 
Similarly, the Bessen-Hunt word-search algorithm suffers not only 
from the problem of overinclusiveness discussed above,53 but also from 
underinclusiveness, because a great many software patents do not include 
the terms “software” or “computer” and “program” in their 
specifications.54 The integral role of computerized data processing in the 
invention may be so clearly understood to the inventors and to other 
experts in a given field that these terms are just not mentioned in the 
patent specification even though a claim element may cover a 
computerized data-processing function.55 Moreover, the exclusion of 
 
 
 48. 438 of the 444 patents in this class are software patents. 
 49. 206 of the 225 patents in this class are software patents. 
 50. 281 of the 332 patents in this class are software patents. 
 51. 327 of the 331 patents in this class are software patents. 
 52. All of the 271 patents in this class are software patents. 
 53. See supra note 35. 
 54. See, e.g., Distributed Routing, U.S. Patent No. 6,370,584 (filed Sept. 1, 1998) Claims clearly 
cover data processing, thus making it a software patent, but written description contained only the 
word “computer” and not “program” or “software,” which would exclude it from the Bessen and 
word-search algorithm. Id. 
 55. Rai and coauthors analyze a sample of over 7,600 patents, all patents issued in 1982, 1987, 
1992, 1997, and 2002 to universities identified by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education as 
research and doctoral universities. Rai et al., supra note 30, at 7. Allison coded these patents as 
software or nonsoftware by manual examination—applying the same protocol as used in this paper. Id. 
at 12–15. To analyze differences between the Allison method and the Bessen-Hunt keyword-search 
algorithm, Bhaven Sampat (one of the coauthors of the Rai et al. study), applied the Bessen-Hunt 
algorithm to the 2,942 university-owned patents issued during 2002 and compared the results to 
Allison’s assessment of those patents. Id. at 12 n.32, 46 tbl.1. Sampat identified large numbers of 
patents that were treated differently, including many software patents that were not identified with the 
Bessen-Hunt algorithm, illustrating significant underinclusiveness. Id. Of the 2,942 patents, the 
Bessen-Hunt keyword search identified 221 patents as software that were not (overinclusiveness), and 
198 as nonsoftware patents that did in fact cover software inventions (underinclusiveness). Id. To 
provide a few examples of underinclusiveness for the present study, Allison studied the first 214 
patents in the list of 2,942 and identified twenty-one of that first 214 as software patents; the Bessen-
Hunt search missed ten of those twenty.  
 To illustrate our view that these patents should qualify as software patents, we provide here 
descriptions of the first five of those ten: 
(1) Variable Resolution Imaging System, U.S. Patent No. 6,335,957 (filed Jan. 12, 1999). The 
patent claims an imaging system for medical and industrial purposes including software 
algorithms that purportedly improve the resolution of images. Software is at the heart of the 
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patents with terms such as “circuit,” “chip,” “circuitry,” “bus,” and 
“semiconductor” in the title removes many software patents, given the 
frequency with which the title of a patent will fail to reflect the true nature 
of the claimed invention.56 
III. WHAT IS THE “QUALITY” AND “VALUE” OF SOFTWARE PATENTS? 
A. Defining Patent “Quality” and “Value” 
1. Different Meanings 
Just as the rapid pace of innovation and the heterogeneous nature of 
software make it difficult to develop a definitive classification of 
 
 
invention, but the Bessen-Hunt keyword search did not identify it as software because the 
terms “software” or “computer” and “program” do not appear in the specification 
(2) Apparatus & Method for Improving Vision & Retinal Imaging, U.S. Patent No. 6,338,559 
(filed Apr. 28, 2000). The patent claims: “a method and optical device for improving human 
vision,” which includes in the claims software for generating high-resolution images of the 
retina. The claims include the term “computer means,” and the specification twice includes 
the term “computer,” but the specification does not explicitly refer to “software” or 
“computer” and “program.” 
(3) Genomics Via Optical Mapping with Ordered Restriction Maps, U.S. Patent No. 
6,340,567 (filed Oct. 3, 2000). The patent abstract states: “[a] method of producing high-
resolution, high-accuracy ordered restriction maps based on data created from the images of 
populations of individual DNA molecules (clones) digested by restriction enzymes. Detailed 
modeling and a statistical algorithm, along with an interactive algorithm based on dynamic 
programming and a heuristic method employing branch-and-bound procedures, are used to 
find the most likely true restriction map . . . .” In the data set used in the Rai et al. study, 
Allison categorizes this as one of a set of “pure” software patents that consist of nothing but 
algorithms. The Bessen-Hunt keyword search did not retrieve the patent because the 
specification did not refer to “software” or “computer” and “program.  
(4) Method for Determining Storm Predictability, U.S. Patent No. 6,340,946 (filed Aug. 3, 
2000). The patent claims a method for determining the predictability of elements in a weather 
radar image—more specifically, a method for generating a predictability score indicative of 
the predictability for a pixel in the weather radar image. Allison coded this patent as not only 
software, but also “pure” software, because the entire invention consisted of data processing. 
Although the specification referred to a “computer system,” it did not refer to “software” or a 
“computer program.” 
(5) Methods for Analysis & Sorting of Polynucleotides, U.S. Patent No. 6,344,325 (filed Feb. 
8, 2000). The patent claims a software-implemented method for analyzing and isolating 
polynucleotide molecules based on size by using an optical signal. Although the patent 
plainly claims data processing techniques, and the specification refers three times to a 
“computer,” it does not refer to “software” and does not use the term “program.” 
 56. See, e.g., Universal Serial Bus Controlled Connect & Disconnect, U.S. Patent No. 6,415,342 
(filed July 27, 1999). The invention in this patent covers a USB device and software for 
communications between the device and the computer to which it is connected and disconnected. The 
specification includes the word “software” once, but the Bessen-Hunt word search would exclude this 
patent because of the word “bus” in the title.  
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“software” patents, the vagueness of common criticisms of software 
patents makes it difficult to be sure what it would mean for a patent to 
have the “quality” that would deflect criticism. A major component of 
“quality” is a strong likelihood that a patent actually covers a novel and 
nonobvious invention and would withstand a challenge to its validity on 
those grounds.57 Another is that the patent’s written description and 
drawings provide enough explanatory support for its claims so as to enable 
a “person having ordinary skill in the art” (“PHOSITA”) to make the 
invention and put it into practice without an undue amount of additional 
experimentation—the so-called “enablement requirement.”58 Although the 
literature suggests reasonably good proxies for novelty and 
nonobviousness,59 we know of none available for descriptive adequacy.  
This Article, for the most part, considers the extent to which software 
patents are likely to withstand challenges to their validity by examining 
the input of the drafter and the patent office. From that perspective, we 
could think of quality in two distinct ways. One possibility—captured in 
complaints that software patents are too broad or fail to account 
adequately for prior art—is that quality refers to the accuracy and 
completeness with which the patent defines an invention and distinguishes 
it from prior art. Thus, this concept of quality is one of craft, focusing on 
the efforts of the patentee and the examiner to produce an appropriate 
description of the invention and to determine that the invention satisfies 
the statutory standards of novelty and nonobviousness.60 One common 
concern here is that current incentives motivate software firms to patent 
too quickly, seeking patent protection without investing the appropriate 
effort to reduce an abstract idea to a useful product.61 Related to that point 
is the problem that patent examiners unfamiliar with a cutting-edge 
technology like software may be less capable of assessing the quality of 
the disclosure or of the innovation than they are in technological areas 
with which they are more familiar. This problem raises the question 
 
 
 57. Under section 102(a), an invention is novel if no identical invention appears in a single piece 
of prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be patentable, an invention must not only be novel but also must 
represent more than an obvious, or trivial, advance over the cumulative prior art. Id. § 103. 
 58. Id. § 112. 
 59. See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.  
 60. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. 
 61. This idea is voiced frequently in Mann’s interviews with venture capitalists and investors in 
software firms, who worry that a focus on rapid-fire patenting distracts from a focus on successful 
product design. 
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whether the patented invention in fact represented a novel and nonobvious 
advance over what had been done before.62  
A second possibility—captured in complaints that software patents are 
trivial or too easy to obtain—is that quality refers to the economic value of 
the patent.63 This conception of quality overlaps with the first, because a 
patent granted without adequate consideration of the prior art is more 
likely to be held invalid. In addition, a patent in which the invention is 
inadequately claimed may fail to capture all of the infringing activity that 
it could have. Yet, this conception of value is only partly dependent on 
quality, because it also encompasses the value of the markets and products 
with which the patent is concerned: the economic value of a patent relates 
directly to the value of the commerce over which the patent grants a right 
to exclude. Thus, value in its broadest conception is not, strictly speaking, 
relevant to the question on which we focus here: how well the system is 
functioning to distinguish “good” and “bad” patents. 
Both of these conceptions of quality have important policy 
implications. The first conception of quality (the ex ante conception) is 
important in efforts to improve the processes by which the PTO considers 
and issues patents. The second conception (the post hoc conception) is 
important in efforts to improve the system by which patents are licensed 
and enforced, to ensure an appropriate balance of access to technology and 
incentive to invent. As we emphasize above, however, this Article focuses 
on the former ex ante conception of quality. 
2. Indicators of “Quality” and “Value” 
The academic literature has been much more successful in efforts to 
identify objective indicators of the post hoc conception of value than it has 
been in identifying objective indicators of the ex ante conception of 
quality. Generally, the strategy has been to identify some objective 
 
 
 62. The requirement that an invention be novel (that there be no single piece of prior art 
disclosing an identical invention) appears in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). The more onerous requirement 
that an invention be “nonobvious” (i.e., that the patent claim something more than an obvious advance 
over the prior art as a whole) appears in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). In the statutory phrasing, the 
nonobviousness determination depends on the perspective of a “PHOSITA,” a hypothetical “person 
having ordinary skill in the art.” Id. 
 63. We refer here to “private value” (the value of a patent to its owner) and not to “social value” 
(the value of a patent to society). Moreover, like most other scholars, we refer to the value of a stand-
alone patent and not to the value that a patent may contribute to a patent portfolio. At least in theory, a 
patent might have little value by itself, but may have value in its contribution to a company’s portfolio 
of patents in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. 
Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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characteristic of a patent or an event in the life of a patent that provides an 
indication that the patent has value, and to search for notable patterns in 
the characteristics of the affected patents.64 
For a single patent, or a small number of patents, a reasonable test of 
quality would be to have a person with ordinary skill in the given art 
conduct a thorough search of the prior art and evaluate the likelihood that 
a patent discloses a novel and nonobvious invention. Such an approach is 
simply not feasible for data sets that contain a large enough number of 
patents for statistical analysis. In any event, the results often would still be 
subject to doubt: this is what is done in patent infringement litigation, 
which frequently involves genuine issues of disputed fact on which patent 
validity depends. 
We explain and measure several indicators of patent quality and value: 
the number of different types of prior art references, the informational 
quality of so-called “nonpatent” prior art references, the number of total 
and independent claims, and the number of “forward citations” (references 
to patents in our data set by later patents). We also mention several other 
potential indicators of quality or value that we are not able to use in our 
study. 
Prior Art. Putting that impractical “first best” solution to one side, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the best proxy we have for patent quality65 is 
the number of prior art references together with (to the extent practicable) 
some assessment of the types and informational content of those 
references and their sources.66 Prior art is the objective evidence of what 
 
 
 64. See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 30; see also Allison & Tiller, supra note 30. 
 65. We note that the quantity of prior art may relate not only to quality but also to value. For 
example, if a thorough search of prior art is expensive, a greater quantity of prior art suggests that the 
patent applicant perceived that its invention was important enough to make this investment. In 
addition, we know from prior research that patents involved in infringement litigation have 
significantly more prior art references than nonlitigated patents. Allison et al., supra note 30. This 
makes sense because, all other things being equal, litigated patents should be more valuable to their 
owners than the general population of patents. However, factors other than the size of the stakes also 
affect the propensity to litigate patents. See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, The Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 49/50 ANNALES D'ECONOMIE ET 
DE STATISTIQUE 223, 223–46 (1998) (Fr.) (surveying empirical studies in economics on intellectual 
property litigation, including the relationship between patent litigation and patent value); Jean O. 
Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 8656, 2001) (finding that the fact, but not the outcome, of litigation 
correlates with patent value). 
 66. See John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality 
One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 751–57 
(2006); Allison & Tiller, supra note 30, at 1045–52; Deepak Hegde & Bhaven N. Sampat, Examiner 
Citations, Applicant Citations, and the Private Value of Patents (Dec. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with authors). 
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previously has been done. The most important types of prior art that can 
be gleaned from patents themselves are references to prior U.S. and 
foreign patents and to prior printed publications of various types (often 
called “nonpatent prior art”). It is intuitively appealing to view the 
quantity and, to the extent we can measure it, the quality of prior art cited 
in patents as indicators of patent quality. Both should correlate with (a) the 
seriousness of the patent applicant’s effort to identify previous inventions 
and distinguish the new invention from prior ones, and with (b) the rigor 
and thoroughness of the PTO’s examination.67 Furthermore, the most 
common basis for judicial invalidation of patents is prior art that was not 
considered by the PTO.68 
That is not to say that the number and quality of references is a perfect 
indicator of patent quality. For example, some applicants load up patents 
with very large numbers of references, in an apparent effort to distract 
attention from the most important prior art references. Yet, in a large data 
set of patents, it is reasonable to think that patents disclosing more prior 
art references reflect a level of effort on the part of the applicant and 
examiner that is higher on average than the effort involved in patents that 
disclose fewer references. For the applicant, greater effort also means 
greater investment. 
Although other objective indicators might seem at first to be more 
relevant to “value” than to “quality,” we believe that they are important as 
well. First, given the imperfection of inferences drawn from prior art, 
additional information about patent value buttresses those inferences. For 
example, suppose, as seems likely, that patent owners (patentees) care 
more about quality when they expect their patents to be valuable. 
Patentees’ ex ante perceptions about value should have some reliability, 
because patentees at the time of filing and prosecution have a considerable 
 
 
 67. Regarding the thoroughness of both the applicant’s prior art search and the examination 
process, patent and nonpatent prior art references may be provided by either the applicant or the 
examiner. Intuitive arguments suggest that patent applicants should be responsible for more prior art 
references than examiners. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 30, at 1037–38 n.167. Recent empirical 
work by Bhaven Sampat quantifies the accuracy of this intuition. See Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do 
Applicants Search for Prior Art? A Window on Patent Quality (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with authors) (concluding that applicants provided 59% of references to prior patents and 90% 
of references to NPPA, with examiners adding 41% and 10%, respectively). 
 68. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 231–34, 251 (1998) (examining the population of litigated patents 
leading to final written decisions on validity or invalidity during 1989–96). The “challenger” to a 
patent’s validity is usually the defendant in a patent infringement suit, but may be a plaintiff in a 
declaratory judgment action.  
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amount of value-relevant information about the market in which they will 
deploy the claimed invention. 
Claims. Like the number of prior art references, the number of claims 
in a patent relates intuitively to patent value. Following the detailed 
written description of the invention in a patent,69 claims identify the 
invention with linguistic precision. Patent claims define the patent owner’s 
property interest.70 Having a patent attorney draft more claims necessarily 
costs more money.71 Moreover, increasing the number of claims in a 
patent sometimes increases the universe of potential infringers and the 
likelihood that the patent will be held to extend to competing products. 
This seems particularly true with respect to independent claims.72 
Empirical research has validated that intuition with respect to the total 
number of claims, illustrating that litigated patents have significantly more 
claims than nonlitigated ones.73 At the same time, as with prior art 
references, the relation between the number of claims and the quality of 
the patent is more ambiguous. A patent with a large number of claims 
often might include broad and ill-confined descriptions of technology 
already in use at the time the applicant filed the application. 
Forward Citations. Another intuitive and empirically validated 
indicator of patent value is the number of times that later patents cite a 
particular patent as prior art (referred to as “forward citations” or 
“citations received”). It is reasonable to expect a correlation between the 
number of forward citations and the relevance of the patent to continuing 
developments in the applicable technological field. The number of forward 
 
 
 69. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (2000). 
 70. Id. ¶ 2. 
 71. More claims in a patent application also modestly increase USPTO examination fees. See 37 
C.F.R. §§ 1.116(h), (i) (2007). 
 72. Patent claims are either independent or dependent. As the term implies, an independent claim 
stands by itself. Each dependent claim adds more specificity to one of the independent claims, 
narrowing its technological reach. The advantage to the patent drafter of the dependent claim is that a 
narrower dependent claim might be held valid, even if the broader independent claim is held invalid. 
Conversely, patent drafters often write multiple independent claims that cover the same invention, 
using different verbal formats to increase the odds that a later product that is substantively identical or 
similar to the disclosed invention will not “slip through the cracks.” Consequently, we should expect a 
positive correlation between the number of independent claims and patent value.  
 One recent example illustrating the private value of using multiple independent claims is the well-
known case of NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), in which NTP 
successfully sued RIM, the maker of the Blackberry personal communication device, for infringement 
of several NTP patents. Id. at 1287–88. The Federal Circuit concluded that the Blackberry functioned 
in a way that did not violate the “method” (i.e., process) claim of the NTP patent. Id. at 1317–18. 
However, it did infringe the NTP patent’s “system” claim. Id. at 1317. 
 73. See Allison et al., supra note 30, at 451–52; Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 
Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001). 
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citations similarly relates to the likelihood that the patent disclosed a 
fundamental development in the particular technology field, thus giving 
the patent owner a valuable “head start.” Moreover, later citations to a 
patent by the owner of the earlier patent (“self-citations”) suggest that the 
patent owner is building a group of patents on closely related 
technological advancements, which suggests a greater likelihood of 
commercial exploitation of the patent. 
Hence, it is no surprise that empirical studies have found significant 
positive correlations between the number of forward citations and value. 
One study, for example, concluded that forward citations relate to the 
market value of the firms that own the underlying patents.74 Other research 
shows that litigated patents have significantly more forward citations than 
unlitigated patents.75 
There are, of course, many reasons unrelated to technological import 
why later patent applications might, or might not, cite a particular patent 
as prior art. Some applications might avoid citing a patent in an effort to 
undermine perceptions of the patent’s quality. This is particularly true in 
the milieu of biotech start-ups, where the details of patent applications are 
a topic of interest to both investors and competitors. It seems a much less 
important concern in the start-up sector of the software industry, in which 
it is considerably less customary for competitors or investors to study the 
details of patent applications.76 Thus, we believe that forward citations are 
a plausible indicator of the post hoc value, and thus an indirect 
confirmation of the ex ante quality. 
Maintenance Fees. Another possible indicator of value is maintenance 
fees. Intuitively, the willingness of patent owners to keep their patents 
alive by paying maintenance fees should relate to the value of the patent to 
its owner.77 The failure of the owners of most patents to pay the relatively 
modest maintenance fees necessary to keep their patents in force suggests 
 
 
 74. Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Market Value and Patent Citations, 36 
RAND J. ECON. 16 (2005); Dietmar Harhoff, Francis Narin, F.M. Scherer & Katrin Vopel, Citation 
Frequency and the Value of Patented Inventions, 81 REV. ECON. STAT. 511 (1999); Manuel 
Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations, 21 RAND J. 
ECON. 172 (1990). 
 75. See Allison et al., supra note 30, at 454–55; Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 65. 
Interestingly, the number of self-citations—citations in later patents granted to the same patent 
owner—correlates even more significantly with litigation propensity than the number of forward 
citations by others. Allison et al., supra note 30, at 454. 
 76. See Mann, supra note 12, at 1004. 
 77. Such fees are due in increasing amounts at 3.5 years ($900), 7.5 years ($2,300), and 11.5 
years ($3,800) after the patent issues. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g) (2006). Those fees are halved for small 
entities. Id.  
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that more than half of all patents are not worth even a few thousand dollars 
a few years after they are issued.78 That intuition is buttressed by empirical 
research identifying strong positive correlations between the indicators of 
value discussed above and maintenance fee payments. Specifically, 
Kimberly Moore concluded that patents with more claims and forward 
citations are more likely to be maintained.79 Although the recency of 
patents in our data set precludes us from using maintenance fees as an 
indicator of value in our work, the relation between maintenance fees and 
the indicators on which we rely adds validation to those indicators.  
Patent Families. The last important indicator of value used in the 
existing literature is the number of countries in which the owner has 
obtained patent protection on the same invention (often referred to as a 
“patent family”). This makes sense because of the large expense of 
patenting in multiple countries. For example, Jean Lanjouw and Mark 
Schankerman have developed a patent quality index that relies on the 
number of claims in the patent, prior art references in the patent, the 
number of forward citations to the patent, and the number of countries in 
which the patentee sought protection for the invention.80 Although the 
number of countries in which an applicant seeks patents on the same 
invention is almost certainly a valid value indicator, it would have little, if 
any, meaning in our study because innovation and patenting in the 
software industry is dominated by the United States. 
 
 
 78. See Jean O. Lanjouw, Ariel Pakes & Jonathan Putnam, How to Count Patents and Value 
Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 405 
(1998); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1504 tbl.3 
(2001). 
 79. Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1530–52 (2005). 
Moore’s bivariate analysis found significant positive relationships between the payment of 
maintenance fees and the number of claims, number of prior art references, and number of forward 
citations. Id. at 1530. In her multivariate logistic regression, however, the number of prior art 
references lost its significance. Id. at 1537–38.  
 This loss of significance for number of references in the multivariate analysis apparently is caused 
by the interaction between numbers of prior art references and numbers of claims. For discussion of 
the correlation between the number of claims and number of prior art references, see Allison & Tiller, 
supra note 30, at 1055 (showing high correlation between number of claims and number of prior art 
references). 
 80. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality and Research Productivity: 
Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON. J. 441, 441–44 (2004). 
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3. Our Approach 
Writing against the backdrop of that literature, we decided for our 
assessment of the quality of software patents to focus on the three data 
points that dominate the existing empirical literature: (1) the number of 
claims in the patent, (2) the number of prior art references in the patent, 
and (3) the number of forward citations to the patent. In an effort to obtain 
more nuanced information about the nature of patenting in the industry, 
we broke down two of those three principal variables into subcategories. 
First, we analyzed not only total claims but also independent claims.81 
Second, we broke down total prior art references in the patent into three 
categories: U.S. patent references, foreign patent references, and nonpatent 
prior art (NPPA) references.82 Given the wide disparity in the 
informational value among NPPA references, we also made a rough 
estimate of the quality of these references by categorizing them according 
to the sources from which they came.  
In total, our approach produced seven different data points that we 
could use to describe the patents: the numbers of total claims, independent 
claims, total references, U.S. patent references, foreign patent references, 
nonpatent references, and forward citations.83 Table 2 sets forth some 
 
 
 81. The only previous analysis of independent claims separate from total (independent plus 
dependent) claims appears in Allison’s previous study. Allison et al., supra note 30, at 451–52, 478–
79. The large population study reported in that paper analyzed only the number of total claims and—
using a multivariate logistic regression—found a highly significant relationship between the number of 
total claims and litigation (litigated patents being viewed as a subset of valuable patents) (p = 
<0.0001). Id. at 478. The smaller, more finely graded sample study reported in that paper analyzed the 
number of independent and dependent claims separately. Bivariate analysis showed highly significant 
relationships between number of both independent and dependent claims and the fact that the patents 
were litigated (p = 0.0011 for independent claims and 0.0044 for dependent claims). Id. at 452 n.68. 
When using a multivariate logistic regression for the sample study, the positive relationship between 
number of independent claims and litigation remained highly significant (p = 0.006), but the 
relationship between number of dependent claims and litigation ceased to be significant at the .05 level 
although significant at the .10 level (p = .08). Id. at 452 n.68, 479. 
 82. Delphion shows both the references themselves and the number of references for U.S. and 
foreign patents. See https://www.delphion.com/research/. For nonpatent references (called “other 
references” in Delphion), however, Delphion only shows the references themselves and does not report 
a count. Id. Moreover, these references are run together as lines in a text file. We developed a 
computer program to count the number of nonpatent references. 
 83. Because some of the patents were issued quite recently, there is a substantial amount of 
truncation in the forward citations. Accordingly, although Table 2 reports a simple descriptive statistic 
for the entire data set, our statistical analysis follows Jaffe and Trajtenberg in analyzing for each patent 
the number of forward citations divided by the average number of citations per patent application filed 
in the same year. See ADAM B. JAFFE & MANUEL TAJTENBERG, PATENTS, CITATIONS, AND 
INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 434–46 (2002). 
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simple descriptive statistics for those variables for the entire data set, 
which includes data for both software and nonsoftware patents.  
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX SD 
MEDIAN 
(BOTTOM 
DECILE) 
MEDIAN 
(LEAST 
CITED) 
TOT. CLAIMS 20.1 18 1 318 13.8 4 16 
IND. CLAIMS 3.7 3 1 92 2.7 1 3 
TOT. REFS 16.0 11 0 470 22.9 3 9 
U.S. PAT. REFS 11.8 9 0 352 14.3 2 8 
FOR. PAT. REFS 0.9 0 0 88 2.5 0 0 
NONPAT. REFS 3.3 1 0 396 12.8 0 0 
FORWARD 
CITATIONS 6.7 3 0 291 10.3 0 -- 
 
As the large standard deviations suggest, there is substantial variance 
among the quality and value indicators in our data set of patents. To 
quantify that variation, the last two columns in Table 2 describe the worst 
of the patents by two separate metrics: the median of the bottom decile of 
each characteristic and the median on each characteristic of the bottom 
decile of patents by forward citations. As those columns show, a 
substantial number of patents fare poorly on the metrics we examine. Most 
notably, one in twenty of the patents have three references or fewer, a 
strikingly low number for any field of search. Thus, although the data do 
undermine the idea that software patents, as a group, are notable for their 
poor quality, they suggest at the same time that a substantial number are of 
low quality. Prior research has shown, however, that patents of all kinds 
vary greatly in their quality and value, many faring very poorly on the 
metrics we use.84  
B. Software and Nonsoftware Patents 
The central question is whether information about the characteristics of 
software patents on the data points summarized in Table 1 suggests that 
software patents are “better” or “worse” in some objective way than other 
patents. The problem in answering that question lies in selecting an 
appropriate baseline. If we were to match the software patents to other 
 
 
 84. Allison & Tiller, supra note 30, at 1036–58 (documenting large variances in these indicators 
in the course of finding that internet-related business method patents had substantially higher value 
and quality indicators than the average patent and than patents in most other technology areas). 
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randomly selected patents issued on the same dates, we might determine 
how software patents differ on the selected characteristics from typical 
patents. However, we ultimately concluded that the most informative way 
to evaluate these patents was to compare the software patents in the data 
set to the nonsoftware patents. Thus, we reduce the number of potential 
confounding variables and study a sample of patents obtained by the same 
set of firms during the same periods, with the only difference being the 
particular types of technology covered by the patents. 
We compared the software and nonsoftware patents among the 20,000 
patents issued to firms other than IBM. As Table 3 illustrates, the software 
patents (SWP) had significantly more total prior art references, claims, 
independent claims, and forward citations than the nonsoftware patents 
(NSWP). All of those differences are significant at least at the 99% 
confidence level (p = 0.01 or less).85 For comparative purposes, we also 
include parallel data on the number of claims and references from the 
roughly contemporaneous sample of one thousand randomly selected 
patents that John Allison and his coauthors analyzed in Valuable Patents.86 
Because the general patents for the most part have even lower indicators of 
quality than the nonsoftware patents in our data set, that comparison 
further buttresses our results. 
 
 
 85. We analyze the differences in Table 3 with a two-sample t test with equal variances. As the 
Statistical Appendix discusses, we investigated the robustness of those differences with a variety of 
controls and multivariate regression models, which buttresses the results discussed in the text. 
 86. Allison et al., supra note 30. 
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TABLE 3: SOFTWARE AND NON-SOFTWARE PATENTS 
 MEAN MEDIAN SD N 
TOT. CLAIMS     
SWP 22.9 20 15.4 14,044 
NSWP 17.8 17 12.4 5,804 
GENERAL 14.9 12 11.5 1,000 
IND. CLAIMS     
SWP 4.2 3 2.8 14,044 
NSWP 3.4 3 2.4 5,804 
ADJ. FORWARD 
CITATIONS 
    
SWP 1.1 0.64 1.46 14,042 
NSWP 0.9 0.49 1.24 5,799 
TOTAL REFERENCES     
SWP 18.5 11 30.5 14,044 
NSWP 14.1 10 16.6 5,804 
GENERAL 15.2 10 16.3 1,000 
U.S. PATENT 
REFERENCES 
    
SWP 12.7 8 18.3 14,044 
NSWP 11.1 8 13.4 5,804 
FOREIGN PATENT 
REFERENCES 
    
SWP 0.84 0 2.82 14,044 
NSWP 1.3 0 2.8 5,804 
NONPATENT 
REFERENCES 
    
SWP 5.0 1 17.9 14,044 
NSWP 1.6 0 4.9 5,804 
 
Generally, those results suggest a sanguine picture of the quality of 
software patents. To be sure, as we discuss in Part IV, it is likely that the 
differences between software patents and nonsoftware patents depend at 
least in part on aspects of software patent drafting and software 
technology. The data do cast doubt, however, on broad assertions and 
anecdotal suggestions that software patents as a group are of lower quality 
than patents in other areas of technology. Given the academic literature 
discussed in the preceding section that links the indicators in Table 3 to 
various indicators of the post hoc value of the patent, the evidence we 
present here suggests that any problems with quality are much more 
ambiguous. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/2
p 297 Allison Mann book pages.doc 1/23/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] THE DISPUTED QUALITY OF SOFTWARE PATENTS 325 
 
 
 
 
The data on types of prior art references is particularly reassuring, 
because the differences between software and nonsoftware patents display 
a pattern that is consistent with the reality of software patent drafting. 
First, the subcategory of foreign patent references is the only one of our 
seven data points that appears in software patents with a lower frequency 
than in nonsoftware patents. The relative paucity of software patents in 
other countries87 and the centrality of the United States to software 
innovation make the infrequency of foreign references entirely predictable. 
Similarly, the recent rise of software patenting suggests that software 
patents would have many more nonpatent references than nonsoftware 
patents during our period of study. We did, in fact, find that the difference 
between software and nonsoftware patents in the number of NPPA 
references is greater than the difference on any other data point. 
To provide a better understanding of the nature of the prior art, we 
examined the NPPA in a random sample of two hundred software and two 
hundred nonsoftware patents from our data set.88 For a large set of patents, 
there is no practicable way to make quality distinctions among the patents 
referred to therein as prior art; that is, there are no feasible means to assess 
the informational value of such references in a large data set. NPPA 
references are, however, susceptible to such quality distinctions, because 
they can be classified in various ways to roughly reflect the probable 
accuracy, reliability, and objectivity of information contained in them. 
Any typology of the many kinds of printed publications (i.e., NPPA) is 
necessarily subject to some subjectivity and uncertainty, but it is possible 
to categorize such references in a way that enables at least a rough 
assessment of relative informational value. For example, an article in a 
journal that has been reviewed by referees or editors possesses a greater 
likelihood of being objective and accurate than an unmediated publication 
by a company or an industry group. The Appendix describes our typology 
of NPPA, developed by one of the authors and his coauthors for two 
previous research projects.89 
 
 
 87. See, e.g., FLORIAN MUELLER, NOT LOBBYISTS AS SUCH (2005) (discussing failure of efforts 
to authorize software patents in the European Union). 
 88. We also analyzed NPPA references in a random sample of fifty IBM patents, thirty-three of 
which turned out to be software and seventeen nonsoftware. The amount of NPPA in these patents was 
so small that we have not reported it in table form. Only twelve out of the thirty-three IBM software 
patents and seven out of seventeen nonsoftware patents cited any NPPA at all. However, one notable 
fact about the NPPA in the IBM patents is that, in the twelve out of thirty-three software patents that 
cited at least some NPPA, thirty-five out of forty-six total NPPA references (76%) were cites to 
academic literature. In the seven out of seventeen nonsoftware patents that cited at least some NPPA, 
only five out of fifteen total NPPA references (33%) were cites to academic literature. 
 89. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 30, at 1045–52. This typology was created by carefully 
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Table 4 shows the results of our study of the NPPA references in a 
random sample of two hundred software patents and two hundred 
nonsoftware patents. Although our purpose here is to assess the NPPA 
qualitatively, the differences in the quantity of NPPA between the two 
samples are striking. Nonsoftware patents cite less than 25% of the NPPA 
cited in software patents. Moreover, 63.5% of nonsoftware patents cite no 
NPPA at all, while only 34.5% of software patents fail to cite any NPPA. 
On the other hand, our categorization of NPPA suggests that the NPPA 
that is cited in nonsoftware patents is not qualitatively inferior to that cited 
in software patents—there is just much less of it. For instance, a 
significantly higher percentage of the NPPA found in nonsoftware patents 
consists of academic literature, although the gap closes considerably when 
we combine academic and trade publications. Like academic journal 
articles, practitioner-oriented trade publications typically must pass a 
review by editors or referees and should be viewed as possessing relatively 
high informational quality. Also, our sample of nonsoftware patents 
includes no references to the popular press, arguably a relatively low-
quality source, whereas such references amount to almost 1/8 of total 
NPPA in the sample of software patents. One cannot make too much of 
these relative differences, however, when they are so overwhelmed by the 
quantity of high-quality NPPA in software patents: the amount of 
academic prior art in software patents is far more than the total amount of 
all nonpatent prior art in nonsoftware patents. The fairest conclusion is 
that, using our categories of NPPA as rough proxies for informational 
quality, software patents fare at least as well as nonsoftware patents, and 
perhaps even a bit better. 
 
 
studying the NPPA references in over one hundred randomly selected internet-related business method 
patents and over one hundred randomly selected patents-in-general, and defining categories based on 
the nature of the reference sources we found in those patents. Id. at 1046. The categories were slightly 
modified in the second article in which one of the authors and another coauthor analyzed the sources 
of NPPA references. See Allison & Hunter, supra note 66, at 741–42.  
 In the first article, the typology combined academic and trade publications. Because of experience 
subsequently gained, in the second article we felt more confident in our ability to distinguish between 
academic and practitioner-oriented trade journals and thus separated them into two categories. We 
separate them in the current study. 
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TABLE 4: NPPA IN SOFTWARE AND NONSOFTWARE PATENTS 
  Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max N 
% of Total 
NPPA 
Academic               
      SW 2.60 0 0.43 0 40 519 37.45% 
      NSW 1.16 0 3.91 0 30 232 68.24% 
Trade               
      SW 1.75 0 1.01 0 200 349 25.18% 
      NSW 0.09 0 0.42 0 3 18 5.29% 
University               
      SW 0.23 0 0.08 0 14 45 3.25% 
      NSW 0.06 0 0.41 0 5 12 3.53% 
Software               
      SW 0.25 0 0.07 0 11 49 3.54% 
      NSW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Patent- Related               
      SW 0.26 0 0.09 0 14 51 3.68% 
      NSW 0.11 0 0.51 0 4 21 6.18% 
Govt. Doc.               
      SW 0.13 0 0.06 0 10 26 1.88% 
      NSW 0.07 0 0.35 0 3 14 4.12% 
Comp./Ind.               
      SW 0.92 0 0.17 0 19 183 13.20% 
      NSW 0.22 0 0.71 0 5 43 12.65% 
Popular Press               
      SW 0.82 0 0.77 0 154 163 11.76% 
      NSW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Other               
      SW 0 0 0 0 1 1 0% 
      NSW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Total               
      SW 6.93 1 28.7 0 384 1386 100% 
      NSW 1.7 0 4.44 0 31 340 100% 
 
C. Patent Quality and Firm Specialization 
The next subject that we analyze is the difference in patenting among 
the types of firms in our data set. We examine that question in two 
different ways: (1) by comparing firms that specialize in software to those 
that have more varied product lines, and (2) by considering a small set of 
large firms to our broader data set. Generally, we find that the patents of 
“pure software” firms are of higher quality than those of firms with 
substantial nonsoftware product lines. This finding is not surprising, 
because it is consistent with the findings above. Surprising, however—
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given the persistent criticisms large firms have leveled at the patents of 
small firms—is the finding that, broadly speaking, there are few notable 
differences between the patents of large firms and those of the industry as 
a whole.  
1. Patenting by Pure Software Firms 
First, we consider the possibility that the patents that pure software 
firms obtain are “better” (or “worse”) in some cognizable way than 
parallel patents obtained by firms that are not pure software firms. We are 
motivated to examine this question because of the apparent differences in 
culture and business strategy between pure software firms (e.g., Microsoft) 
and the large number of electronics firms that are important software 
developers and patentees in our data set (IBM being the most obvious 
example).90 
For these purposes, we decided (somewhat arbitrarily) to treat firms 
with 80% or more of their revenues from software as pure software firms 
and those with less than 80% of their revenues from software as mixed 
software firms. Under this definition, of the 294 firms in our data set to 
which patents were issued during the five-year period (a large majority of 
the firms obtained no patents during that period), 208 (71%) were pure 
software firms and 86 (29%) were mixed firms. One reason to think that 
this division should be important for patenting practices is that the patents 
of the software firms were almost exclusively software patents (3948/4006 
or 99%), while software patents represented only 64% of patents obtained 
by mixed firms (10,092/15,838). 
The software patents obtained by software firms differed significantly 
in all relevant respects from the software patents obtained by mixed 
firms.91 As we report in Table 7 in the Statistical Appendix, the results are 
strikingly similar to the results in Table 3: highly significant differences 
for numbers of total claims, independent claims, adjusted forward 
citations, foreign patent references (negative), and nonpatent references. 
The last finding—showing that later patents cite the software patents of 
pure software firms significantly more—suggests that the software patents 
 
 
 90. See Allison, Dunn & Mann, supra note 1 (including a detailed discussion of the differing 
exploitation strategies of incumbents, venture-backed start-ups, open-source developers, and 
independent developers). 
 91. In a related paper using this same data set, we find no significant relation between the share 
of a firm’s revenue attributable to software sales and either the rate of patenting or propensity to 
patent. Id. 
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of pure software firms are more rapidly integrated into future software 
innovation than the software patents of mixed software firms. 
This finding parallels the recent finding of Graham and Mowery that 
the quality of patents (measured solely by number of forward citations) 
held by software firms is higher than the quality of patents held by 
electronics firms.92 They attribute this distinction to greater strategic 
patenting by electronics firms (that is, patenting for occupying general 
fields of technology rather than for protecting products of the patentee).93 
Our data make us skeptical of that explanation, primarily because the 
nonsoftware patents held by pure software firms do not differ nearly so 
much from the nonsoftware patents held by mixed software firms as do the 
respective sets of software patents. Of course, it is possible that electronics 
firms use strategic patenting more aggressively in the software area than 
they do in nonsoftware areas. It seems more likely to us, however, that the 
differences reflect the interaction of two distinct effects: (1) that software 
patents tend to have more substance (claims, references, and citations) 
than nonsoftware patents, and (2) that pure software firms are better able 
to integrate their software patents into their subsequent development 
efforts. 
2. Patenting by Superpatentees 
To get at the possibility of cultural differences in an alternative way, 
we also compared the software patents of fifteen “superpatentee” firms to 
the software patents of other firms in our data set. The superpatentee firms 
were those firms that appeared in the data set every one of the five years 
and that have at least fifty total patents.94 Here, as Table 8 summarizes, we 
found—to our surprise—no significant differences between the software 
patents of the superpatentee firms and the software patents of other firms 
in our data set. Among other things, the data replicate the large standard 
deviations that characterize the software patent data for our larger data set: 
even for the superpatentee firms, a substantial number of the patents have 
very few claims, references, and forward citations. As previously 
observed, however, large variances and substantial numbers of patents 
 
 
 92. Graham & Mowery, Software Patents, supra note 14, at 24. 
 93. Id. 
 94. These firms are: Adobe, Apple, Autodesk, Computer Associates, EDS, EMC, HP, Mentor 
Graphics, Microsoft, NCR, Novell, Oracle, Qualcomm, Sun, Sybase, Synopsys, and Unisys. We 
excluded IBM from the list because (as explained above) we did not review IBM’s patents to divide 
the software patents from the nonsoftware patents. 
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having low quality and value indicators are characteristic of patents in 
general. 
Attempting to investigate the question more precisely, we then 
analyzed the software patents of superpatentee firms on a sector-by-sector 
basis, grouping the firms into electronics firms, prepackaged software 
firms, and system design and processing firms.95 Generally, as Table 9 
summarizes, our data buttress the discussion above, indicating that the 
distinctive software patents are most likely to be found among the 
relatively pure prepackaged software firms. Specifically, we find for those 
firms robust positive differences related to the numbers of total claims and 
independent claims, with marginally significant negative differences 
related to the number of U.S. patent references and foreign patent 
references. 
Putting that narrow finding to one side, we are struck by our inability to 
find substantial differences in quality and value based purely on the size of 
the firms. As we discuss below, we think this has important implications 
for the course of patent reform. 
D. Patent Quality and Value over Time 
Our last inquiry into patent quality and value relates to the quality of 
the relevant patents over time. If the focus of the concern about quality is 
that the quality of software patents has been degrading rapidly since the 
legal environment became more conducive to them in the mid-1990s, a 
discussion of the quality of software patents must include some 
information about how their quality has changed over time. 
Because the data set described above is limited to patents issued 
between 1998 and 2002, we used for this analysis a separate data set of all 
patents issued to the fifteen superpatentee firms, based on applications 
filed since 1990. This allows us to collect evidence about how our various 
indicators of patent quality changed during the 1990s for the largest firms 
in the three major sectors of large patentees discussed above.96 To be sure, 
this data set is much less inclusive than the data set we analyze above. 
Moreover, this data set does not focus solely on software patents, because 
we did not individually separate software from nonsoftware patents. Still, 
 
 
 95. The firms are distinguished by three-digit NAICS codes: 334 for the electronics firms 
(Apple, EMC, HP, NCR, Qualcomm, and Sun), 511 for the prepackaged software firms (Adobe, 
Autodesk, Computer Associates, Microsoft, Oracle, Sybase, and Synopsys), and 541 for the system 
design and processing firms (EDS, IBM, Mentor Graphics, Novell, and Unisys). 
 96. Due to concerns about truncation from as-yet-unissued patents, the analysis in this section 
ends with patents for which applications were filed in 2002. 
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it is likely that most of these patents disclose software inventions because 
of our limitation to the group of software superpatentee firms. Thus, this 
data set provides considerable evidence about trends in software patenting 
quality over time in the industry. 
In general, the data suggest that the quality and value of patents did not 
degrade substantially during the 1990s.97 For example, as Figure 1 shows, 
there has been a slow but steady increase in the number of independent 
claims for electronics and system design firms. By contrast, the number of 
independent claims in patents by prepackaged software firms rose much 
more rapidly until 1994, but has fallen since then to a level that 
approximates the level of the other sectors. It is apparent that events at the 
middle of the decade affected the patenting practices of prepackaged 
software firms (Figure 1, sector 2) differently than the practices of the 
large firms in the other sectors. A possible explanation is that legal rules 
making it easier to patent software inventions more directly lessened the 
need for circuitous claim drafting and thus lowered the number of claims 
necessary for a sophisticated patentee to describe a particular invention. In 
any event, none of the three sectors had fewer independent claims in 2002 
than in 1990.98 
FIGURE 1: INDEPENDENT CLAIMS OVER TIME 
 
 
 
 97. For a typical criticism of the PTO’s work during this period, see ADAM JAFFE & JOSH 
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING 
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 142–50 (2004). 
 98. Data on total claims show a similar pattern. 
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Figures 2 and 3 summarize parallel data on total prior art references 
and U.S. patent references, which show a steady rise throughout the 1990s, 
with the patents of prepackaged software firms trending upward 
substantially more rapidly than those of firms in the other sectors. Again, 
it is clear that the time pattern of the patents of prepackaged software firms 
is different than the pattern of other firms’ patents, but the pattern 
suggests, if anything, that those patents gained in references even more 
rapidly than the patents of firms in other sectors. Presumably this is 
because of the rapid increase in innovation in that sector, which provided a 
steady increase of relevant prior art appropriate for citation. 
FIGURE 2: TOTAL REFERENCES OVER TIME 
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FIGURE 3: DOMESTIC REFERENCES OVER TIME 
 
We emphasize that these time patterns do not prove that the patterns of 
prepackaged software firms were “better” than the patents of firms in the 
other sectors. These results do make it harder, however, to credit the 
common assertion that software patents declined rapidly in quality during 
that period. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
As the discussion above emphasizes, our work is suggestive. The 
complexity of the questions that we investigate makes definitive answers 
almost impossible. Thus, for example, although we believe that our 
definition and method of identifying a software patent is better than those 
used by other researchers in the existing literature, we recognize that 
others may find other approaches more appealing, largely because of the 
huge opportunity costs associated with manual examination of large data 
sets of individual patents. However, the difficulty other scholars will find 
in using our definition makes this work all the more valuable, because we 
can provide an unparalleled examination of patents on software inventions 
based on a patent-by-patent review. 
In our view, the data are important for two separate reasons. First, the 
data substantially undermine the traditional story that large firms in the 
software industry are plagued by a large number of low-quality patents 
obtained by the smaller firms in the industry. On the contrary, by objective 
standards, software patents as a group compare quite favorably to patents 
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that the same firms are obtaining, at the same time, on nonsoftware 
inventions. Similarly, the patents obtained by small firms are no worse 
than the patents of the large firms. 
These findings have in our view twin implications for patent policy. 
The first is the simplest: they undercut the common suggestions that 
software patents should be prohibited entirely or should face special 
hurdles for examination designed to stem the alleged flood of low-quality 
patents. If, in fact, there is no flood of low-quality patents, then there is 
little reason to take aggressive action to respond. The second implication 
is more speculative, but rests on the idea that the effort and investment of 
resources to obtain stronger and broader patents does not depend 
substantially on the applicant’s size or patenting experience. To the extent 
that this is true, our findings undermine the concern that small firms will 
suffer disproportionately from reforms that raise the bar for patent grants, 
such as increased examination fees, special procedures for “gold-plated” 
patents, or additional opportunities for pregrant opposition. If patent 
drafting is a routine exercise in which firms of all sizes do a better (or 
worse) job based on the incentives that the PTO’s procedures present, then 
this presents a reasonable case for reforms designed to reward applicants 
that put more effort into their application or who are willing to provide 
more credible support for their application (as evidenced by a willingness 
to submit their application to a more onerous process). 
In addition to their policy implications, our findings provide a rare 
empirical illustration of the context of patent drafting. For example, the 
findings on prior art references seem to match up well with anecdotal 
understandings about the software industry indicating that, until recently, 
there were relatively few U.S. patents and very few foreign patent 
references available but a relatively large amount of NPPA. First, the 
centrality of U.S. firms to cutting-edge software innovation provides 
emphatic support for the finding that software patents cite relatively few 
foreign patent references. Similarly, our early point in the era of routine 
software patenting suggests that, at least as compared to other fields of 
technology, the balance of patent and nonpatent prior art should be 
weighted more heavily in favor of NPPA.  
Second, our findings regarding the number of total and independent 
claims rest at least in part on techniques of software patent drafting. This 
is particularly true in the case of pure software patents, which cover those 
inventions that consist solely of software rather than inventions in which 
software is merely a critical part. Allison’s examination of tens of 
thousands of patents over the last decade persuades him that software 
patent applicants are more likely than other patent applicants to claim 
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software inventions in duplicative ways within a given patent. Therefore, 
for example, software patents often include separate sets of claims that 
characterize the invention as a method (or process), a machine or 
apparatus (or “device”), and a “system.”99 
We posit two possible explanations. First, this phenomenon could 
depend on habits developed in earlier years, when doubt about the 
patentability of pure software made it important for the patent to show 
some “physical transformation.” In that era, it was common for software 
patents to claim as machines or devices with terminology from the older 
mechanical and electronic arts, often describing a phantom physical 
structure in the specification and then claiming the invention as a “means” 
for performing certain functions.100 Later, when it became clear that pure 
software was patentable, applicants began to claim software inventions 
directly as methods or systems, but often they still included the older 
claiming formats.101 Moreover, even now, many modern software patents 
do cover inventions that have physical elements as well as software 
elements. In those cases, it is quite natural to use a number of different 
claim formats in the same patents.102 To be sure, patents on other types of 
inventions often claim an invention using two or more claim formats, such 
as a device and a method, but the tendency is more pronounced for 
software patents, likely accounting for a portion of the finding that 
software patents have more total and independent claims.  
Second, by its nature, a software invention can be conceptualized in 
more ways than many other types of invention. Unlike inventions in most 
other fields, it is not unusual to simultaneously regard software as a 
method or process, a machine or device, a system, and a means for 
performing specified functions. 
Third, the relatively high number of forward citations could partly 
reflect the status of software as a hot area for innovation; it is likely that 
there will be more patents issued in technological areas related to software 
than in other technological areas. This phenomenon would lead, in due 
course, to a substantially greater number of forward citations for software 
patents than for nonsoftware patents. 
 
 
 99. See, e.g., Item Removal System & Method, U.S. Patent No. 5,886,634 (filed May 5, 1997). 
 100. See, e.g., Raster Scan Waveform Display Rasterizer with Pixel Intensity Gradation, U.S. 
Patent No. 5,440,676 (filed Jan. 29, 1988). 
 101. See, e.g., Hot Spot Analysis of IMS Databases, U.S. Patent No. 6,418,443 (filed Feb. 1, 
2000). 
 102. See, e.g., Scanned Retinal Display with Exit Pupil Selected Based on Viewer’s Eye Position, 
U.S. Patent No. 6,352,344 (filed Feb. 14, 2001).  
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If those features of the software patenting environment lead directly to 
the relatively high quality and value indicators of the patents in our data 
set, then scholars will need to proceed with care before adapting the 
existing “valuable patent” methodology to studies of patent quality in 
particular industries—a methodology honed for the most part on economy-
wide studies of large data sets. To make comparative judgments about 
patent quality in particular industries, it is necessary to develop 
quantitative measures of the environment for patenting as it exists in each 
industry. In this context, however, the juxtaposition of findings persuades 
us that the best explanation of our data is the optimistic one. It is possible 
for the skeptic to explain away the significance of each of the separate 
quantitative findings about software patents, as the last few pages have 
attempted to do. There comes a point, though, when the need for so many 
complex explanations suggests that the simpler explanation is the better 
one: software patents as they have been issued in this country to software 
firms starting in the late 1990s in fact display impressive objective 
indications of quality and value. 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
A. Software and Nonsoftware Patents 
To test the robustness of the simple t-tests that we report in the text, we 
introduced a number of controls. Our analysis treats our seven indicators 
of quality and value as alternative dependent variables. For each of those 
variables, we conducted a series of multivariate linear regressions that 
included several controls in addition to the software patent/nonsoftware 
patent variable: year dummies (to account for the changes in the relevant 
characteristics over time),103 industry sector dummies (to account for the 
differences in technology in different sectors of the software industry), and 
a pure-software firm dummy (that distinguishes between firms that obtain 
80% or more of their revenue from software and those that have 
substantial nonsoftware product lines). To control for problems of 
autocorrelation, we cluster the standard errors for each firm.104 
 
 
 103. We attempted to analyze the nature of the changes over time, but the coefficients and t-
statistics on the dummies for the individual years were unstable and did not display any obvious 
pattern. Accordingly, we do not report that information here. 
 104. See W.H. Rogers, Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples, 13 STATA TECHNICAL 
BULLETIN 19 (1993). 
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The first two columns of Table 5 report the results of those regressions 
(the coefficient on the SWP variable as an independent variable) for each 
of the different dependent variables. They confirm the central results in 
Table 3 with respect to claims, independent claims, foreign references and 
other references. The results for adjusted forward citations do not hold up 
as consistently in the various regression models. We do not weigh that 
analysis heavily, however, because of the likelihood that the combination 
of the truncation of those data and our Jaffe-Trajtenberg105 adjustment 
have diluted the ability of our data to provide information on that question. 
With respect to prior art references in the patents, we note that the models 
discussed below suggest that the significance of the number of total prior 
art references and U.S. patent references is unstable. Still, the number of 
foreign patent references is significantly lower in software patents and the 
number of nonpatent references is significantly higher (both as in Table 3 
and as discussed in the text).106 
TABLE 5: SOFTWARE PATENT REGRESSION MODELS 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
LINEAR 
COEFF. 
LINEAR 
T-STAT. 
XTREG FE 
COEFF. 
XTGREG FE 
T-STAT. 
TOTAL CLAIMS 1.87 4.09 1.98 7.50 
INDEPENDENT 
CLAIMS 0.40 3.35 0.44 8.73 
ADJ. FORWARD 
CITATIONS 0.09 1.13 0.06 2.18 
TOTAL 
REFERENCES 2.31 2.81 2.69 5.41 
U.S. PATENT 
REFERENCES 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.68 
FOREIGN 
PATENT 
REFERENCES 
–0.50 –2.45 –0.49 –10.35 
NONPATENT 
REFERENCES 2.77 5.28 2.97 10.47 
 
 
 
 105. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 106. We conducted similar regressions to consider whether IBM patents (almost half of our data 
set) differ from patents held by other firms. Those regressions suggested that IBM patents generally 
have fewer claims, references, and forward citations. We do not weigh those results heavily (and do 
not report them here), because they seem to reflect the fact that the share of IBM’s patents that are 
software patents (55%, by our estimate) is smaller than the share of the patents of other firms in our 
data set that are software patents (68%). 
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We next estimated a firm-level fixed-effects model (using the xtreg 
function in Stata). This truncates our data considerably, because it 
analyzes only the patents of those firms that have both software and 
nonsoftware patents. Nevertheless, as the third and fourth columns of 
Table 5 report, those regressions produced results quite similar to those 
from the simple linear regressions reported in the first two columns of 
Table 5. To control for skewed data distributions, we also conducted a 
parallel set of regressions using the log of the dependent variables and 
Poisson regressions. (We use Poisson regressions rather than logs for the 
data on adjusted forward citations because many of the data points are 
zero.) Table 6 reports those results, which are quite similar to the results in 
Table 5. Finally, although we do not report them here, we also estimated 
parallel models controlling for both national and international patent 
classes. The results are similar to those in Tables 5 and 6.  
TABLE 6: CONTROLS ON SOFTWARE PATENT REGRESSIONS 
 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
 
COEFF. (T) 
ON LOG OF 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
XTREG FE 
COEFF. (T) 
ON LOG OF 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
 
 
POISSON 
COEFF. (Z) 
 
 
XTPOISSON 
FE COEFF. 
(Z) 
TOTAL CLAIMS 0.10 (4.33) 0.11 (8.27) -- -- 
INDEPENDENT 
CLAIMS 0.13 (4.87) 0.13 (11.71) -- -- 
ADJ. FORWARD 
CITATIONS -- -- 0.10 (1.15) 0.05 (2.76) 
TOTAL 
REFERENCES 0.05 (0.58) 0.07 (4.27) -- -- 
U.S. PATENT 
REFERENCES –0.009 (–0.13) –0.002 (–0.12) -- -- 
FOREIGN 
PATENT 
REFERENCES 
–0.14 (–4.08) –0.13 (–4.79) -- -- 
NONPATENT 
REFERENCES 0.23 (4.00) 0.30 (9.48) -- -- 
B. Nonpatent Prior Art (NPPA) 
When there was any doubt about how to categorize a particular 
reference, we thoroughly searched the internet to achieve a high degree of 
confidence about the appropriate classification. Our nine categories of 
NPPA are as follows: 
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(1) Academic Publications: This category represents publications of 
a type for which there is an independent intermediating influence 
such as one or more editors or referees to increase the probability of 
accuracy, reliability, and objectivity, and which are targeted 
primarily at an academic, scholarly audience. The primary 
components of this category are academic books, book chapters, 
journal articles, and academic proceedings papers, all of which have 
been independently screened for accuracy and objectivity. 
(2) Trade Publications: This category includes trade books and 
chapters, trade journal articles, and similar items. Trade publications 
are targeted primarily at a practitioner audience rather than an 
academic one, and report on developments in a field rather than 
create new knowledge in that field as academic works are more 
likely to do. Like academic publications, trade publications are a 
type of nonpatent prior art for which there is an independent 
intermediating influence such as one or more editors or referees to 
increase the probability of accuracy and objectivity. Although these 
publications are quite unlikely to be subject to the same degree of 
rigorous peer review as academic publications, they nevertheless 
constitute prior art of relatively high quality and are a good 
reflection of the state of the art at the time of publication. 
(3) University Publications: This category includes publications 
from universities or consortia of universities, such as those from 
university research labs, departments (such as computer science, 
electrical engineering, information systems, business, etc.), 
individual faculty, and graduate student theses/dissertations. 
Because these types of publications are developed in an 
environment of objective academic inquiry, they typically will be 
prior art of good quality, although this quality is probably quite 
variable. 
(4) Software: This category includes software programs and 
software documentation. These are separated from other company- 
or industry-sponsored publications because of their functional 
nature and obvious need for a high degree of accuracy and 
objectivity compared with less functionally motivated company-
sponsored prior art. Software and software documentation therefore 
represent prior art of comparatively high quality. 
(5) Patent-Related: This category includes published patent 
applications and patent office search reports, such as PCT (Patent 
Cooperation Treaty) and EPO (European Patent Office) search 
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reports. Such publications are likely to be of highly variable quality 
as prior art. Published patent applications are of uncertain quality as 
prior art because they have not yet been examined or otherwise 
tested. Published search reports are likely to be more objective and 
reliable than published applications because of the involvement of 
independent search authorities. 
(6) Government Documents: This category includes documents 
published by U.S. and foreign governments and by international 
government organizations such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), as well as websites sponsored by such 
entities. The category does not include U.S. and foreign patent-
related documents such as published patent applications and search 
reports, which are treated separately because of their special nature. 
The quality of government documents as prior art is likely to be 
extremely variable. 
(7) Company/Industry Publications: This category includes press 
releases, websites, advertisements, technical disclosure bulletins, 
and various other publications that were produced by individual 
companies or industry groups and published with no independent 
intermediating influence to increase the probability of accuracy and 
objectivity. It does not include software and software 
documentation, however, because the latter are sufficiently distinct 
from and inherently more reliable than other types of publications 
from companies or industry groups. After removing software and 
software documentation from the category, company- and industry-
sponsored publications overall cannot be treated as high quality 
prior art. 
(8) Popular Press: This category includes not only newspapers, 
magazines, and other publications of general interest, but also news 
publications aimed at general business and legal audiences. The 
relative quality of such publications varies greatly but overall is 
relatively low. 
(9) Other: This category includes sundry items such as individual 
websites, but most references placed in this category are those in 
which insufficient information was provided for determining what 
the item really was, even after we conducted a thorough internet 
search of key names and terms in the incomplete reference. One 
example is a reference to a partial title of an item, followed by 
“found on the web on x date.” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/2
p 297 Allison Mann book pages.doc 1/23/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] THE DISPUTED QUALITY OF SOFTWARE PATENTS 341 
 
 
 
 
C. Pure and Mixed Software Firms 
TABLE 7: PURE AND MIXED SOFTWARE FIRMS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE SW_SWF COEFF. (T) NONSW_SWF (T) 
TOTAL CLAIMS 4.04 (6.76) 0.18 (0.10) 
INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 0.45 (2.17) –0.05 (–0.19) 
ADJ. FORWARD CITATIONS 0.19 (3.29) 0.004 (0.12) 
TOTAL REFERENCES 2.45 (1.65) –0.34 (–0.21) 
U.S. PATENT REFERENCES 0.71 (0.78) –1.96 (–1.42) 
FOREIGN PATENT REFERENCES –0.16 (–0.93) –0.024 (–0.51) 
NONPATENT REFERENCES 1.90 (3.18) 1.86 (2.44) 
 
The results here reflect linear regressions on our seven dependent 
variables by comparing software patents obtained by pure software firms 
to software patents obtained by mixed software firms—controlling, as in 
Tables 4 and 5, for year and sector and clustering on the individual firm. 
The first column compares software patents obtained by pure software 
firms (SW_SWF) to software patents obtained by mixed software firms. 
The second column compares nonsoftware patents obtained by pure 
software firms (NONSW_SWF) to nonsoftware patents obtained by mixed 
software firms. 
D. Superpatentees and Other Software Firms 
TABLE 8: SUPERPATENTEES AND OTHER SOFTWARE FIRMS 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
LINEAR COEFF. 
(T) 
LOG COEFF. 
(T) 
POISSON COEFF. 
(Z) 
TOTAL CLAIMS –1.21 (–0.65) –0.01 (–0.08) -- 
INDEPENDENT 
CLAIMS 0.151 (0.49) 0.047 (0.67) -- 
ADJ. FORWARD 
CITATIONS –0.188 (–1.66) -- –0.163 (–1.68) 
TOTAL 
REFERENCES –4.24 (–1.49) –0.185 (–1.92) -- 
U.S. PATENT 
REFERENCES –3.65 (–1.73) –0.197 (–2.42) -- 
FOREIGN PATENT 
REFERENCES –0.067 (–0.33) –0.067 (–1.11) -- 
NONPATENT 
REFERENCES –0.529 (–0.60) –0.120 (–1.09) -- 
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The results here reflect regressions on our seven dependent variables 
comparing software patents obtained by superpatentee firms to software 
patents obtained by other software firms—controlling for year and 
clustering on the individual firm. The first column reflects simple linear 
regressions. The second reflects regressions on the log of the dependent 
variable. As in Table 6, we use a Poisson regression (reported in the third 
column) for adjusted forward citations, because of the large number of 
data points that are zero.  
TABLE 9: PREPACKAGED SOFTWARE SUPERPATENTEES 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
LINEAR COEFF. 
(T) 
LOG COEFF. 
(T) 
POISSON COEFF. 
(Z) 
TOTAL CLAIMS 3.34 (2.71) 0.212 (4.14) -- 
INDEPENDENT 
CLAIMS 0.85 (3.39) 0.209(3.87) -- 
ADJ. FORWARD 
CITATIONS –0.064 (–0.61) -- –0.053 (–0.62) 
TOTAL REFERENCES –3.45 (–1.19) –0.065 (–0.76) -- 
U.S. PATENT 
REFERENCES –3.60 (–1.77) –0.152 (–2.19) -- 
FOREIGN PATENT 
REFERENCES –0.34 (–2.00) –0.095 (–1.73) -- 
NONPATENT 
REFERENCES –0.49 (–0.52) –0.064 (–0.77) -- 
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